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I. R H E C O U K I O L U T F A L S E R R H ) IN A F F I R M I N C 1111* 
DISTRICT COl 'R I AS t O T H F \ OIK DIRE Ql JF^ 1 ' »NS 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
A. Plaintiff was en dl in I In lln, 11 IIK<-J-nl voir dire. 
) ;.;.-, .a-, ii. in ilte absence of objection by the defendant 
i " •- * * Boyle's proposed questions regarding .*••= l »»:nted out in 
Mr. Bo\ le"s opening brief, the n *,,, ...iui i r due (<niiscd on information that migh' be 
useful :~ . i.al.Oiu ,.
 r ' uut tixx^  L U L I i. repeatedly empha^,*. . ? a 
| . .T: . ::,n! ': i ian nial requires the ability to U.. n .. • ? • *• lor the 
intelligent exercise of peremptory challenge ;.- Alcazar v. Universii) of Utah 
Hospitals, et al, 2008 I T App ll..-V. I KN I'.Jd 490. 
Mi ' 'hrMensen argues on appeal th.il the Conr* ii Appeals CMIKVIIV deiermined 
that the trial cone's purportedly " r e t a i l
 M..e*. • ? * enl to shed light on the 
jurors' potential Piu e^:>. i> * . -• " !
 ; i4ie problem with this argument is 
that i^stions wert i_-,- M dl ;elafed in <:uhstanic \-
proposed voir dire questions. Rather than asking "lel.iled" ijurstinns, or modilying or 
simplifying the wording ol plamliir •, requested voir dire, the trial com! omitted the entire 
line ol . jiu >ii- * ..-., - nosed b\ Mr. Boyle. Not one of the trial con. _^e-p* ; • - \ 
--' 'hing about tort reform. As a result, lie u..-. .• . n •! -»i^ were not designed to 
ascertain jurors'views about toil lelnr in -ml pep- m.i1 mjiny lawsuits. Alcazar, supra. 
'there •-. .. * l,-»ut Mi Boyle's request in his proposed question1* i rl 
• •;• v proposed by iiinp the only four that did /,<>; v .tu . , . . - background 
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inquiries addressed the same issue: tort reform. See R. 599-600. This was not some 
arcane legal concept; this was an area in which the law has been "clear" for fifteen years. 
Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2009 UT App 35, 204 P.3d 204. Nonetheless, the trial court 
rejected all of the tort reform questions. 
Mr. Christensen argues, however, that, "in their totality and in context," these two 
questions were sufficient to "elicit substantially equivalent information" as the 
information sought in Mr. Boyle's questions: 
13. Do you have any feelings or beliefs that would prevent you from 
being fair and impartial regarding persons who have personal injury disputes and 
who choose to resolve those disputes by going to court? 
14. Do you have any personal religious or other beliefs that would 
prevent you from awarding damages in a large amount, small amount, or zero 
amount, if warranted and justified by the evidence and the law given you by the 
Court? 
(Brief of Appellee, p. 18, citing R. 536.) 
It was this very type of generic questioning that the Court found insufficient in 
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), and its progeny. See Bee, supra; Alcazar, 
supra; Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Such questions may filter 
out jurors who are sufficiently self-aware and honest to answer them "No," but they do 
not elicit impressions or viewpoints as needed for meaningful peremptory challenges. 
The trial court's failure to touch on tort reform at all is a key distinction between 
this case and Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
cited by Mr. Christensen. In that case, the plaintiff appealed from a trial court's decision 
with respect to voir dire. "[T]he gist of plaintiff s questions went to the issue of potential 
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juror bias against large monetary awards." Id. at 447. Unlike this case, the trial court in 
Ostler covered the subject requested by the plaintiff, just with differently worded 
questions. Id. 
Mr. Christensen says that the trial court asked "extensive questions of the jury 
during oral voir dire in order to discover any potential bias or prejudice." (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 19.) But these "follow-up questions" only followed up on the threshold 
questions that the court asked, none of which encompassed tort reform. 
Mr. Christensen also attempts to distinguish Alcazar by pointing out that that case 
was a medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff submitted voir dire that was specific 
to medical malpractice claims. "Here," Mr. Christensen says, "the underlying case deals 
with an auto/pedestrian accident, but the questions Plaintiff argues should have been 
asked dealt with tort reform in general." (Brief of Appellee, p. 16.) Alcazar was indeed a 
medical malpractice case. Bee was a slip and fall. In both cases, this Court said that tort 
reform should be addressed. As suggested by its name, in jurors' minds, the "tort 
reform" movement extends to all "tort" cases. As such, the Court of Appeals' affirmance 
of the trial court's failure to inquire regarding tort reform during voir dire should be 
reversed. 
B. The Court of Appeals incorrectly found that Mr. Boyle failed to 
preserve his request for tort reform voir dire. 
Mr. Christensen does not contest the fact that Mr. Boyle timely submitted a 
written request that jurors be questioned about their views on tort reform. See R. 596-600 
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(plaintiffs requested questionnaire and voir dire). Nor does he deny that the trial court 
did not announce its decision on that request before it conducted the voir dire. 
Nonetheless, Mr. Christensen claims that Mr. Boyle was required to state his 
request again "after receiving the court's written questions" - in other words, after the 
trial court had already ruled on the requested voir dire. (Brief of Appellee, p. 9) 
(emphasis added). That is incorrect. With the exception of jury instructions, which are 
governed by a separate rule (U.R.Civ.P. 51), the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide 
that no exception need be taken of a ruling that has already occurred. U.R.Civ.P. 46 
states: 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient 
that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes 
known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to 
the action of the court and his grounds therefore; and, if a party has no opportunity 
to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection 
does not thereafter prejudice him. 
(Emphasis added.) 
There is no dispute that, "at the time the ruling [was] sought," Mr. Boyle "ma[de] 
known to the court the action which he desire[d] the court to take," i.e., to ask prospective 
jurors about their views on tort reform. Rule 46 eliminates any requirement that an 
attorney repeat a request that has already been denied by the court. 
Mr. Christensen incorrectly implies that the trial court asked counsel if additional 
questions were desired, and that Mr. Boyle's counsel could have reiterated his request for 
tort reform questions at that time. His brief states: 
When the jury pool was brought back before the judge [after a recess], he asked 
many additional questions of juror number 8. (Id. at 93-97.) After his 
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questioning, the court invited counsel for both parties up for a bench conference 
and specifically asked if they [had] any further questions, and both parties 
indicated that they had nothing further. (Id. at 97:10-18.) 
(Brief of Appellee, p. 10.) 
The transcript reveals that the trial court's inquiry was actually limited to any 
further questions of Juror No. 8 (who happened to be former insurance defense lawyer 
Carmen Kipp's widow). After asking Mrs. Kipp about her husband's practice and her 
own experience as a legal secretary (R. 693, pp. 92-97), a bench conference was held in 
which the court asked only, "Did you have any other questions you want me to put to 
her?" (Id, p. 97:15-16.) 
It is obvious from that context that the trial court was asking whether counsel had 
more questions for "her," i.e., Mrs. Kipp, not inviting exceptions to his overall voir dire. 
In fact, unlike jury instructions, at no point during the voir dire process did the court ask, 
or provide an opportunity, for exceptions. Upon the conclusion of its questioning of the 
panel, the court proceeded immediately into the challenge phase of the selection. (R. 
693, p. 90 (upon conclusion of panel questioning, court states, "[T]he record should 
reflect, again, this is case number 050912506. I have in chambers Mr. [Roger] 
Christensen [counsel for Boyle] and Ms. Van Orman [counsel for Christensen]. And 
we're at a point in the jury selection phase of the case where we have questioned 16 panel 
members. And I understand that Ms. Van Orman wishes to challenge for cause one of 
the first 16 panel members. Go ahead, Ms. Van Orman. . . .")) 
Under U.R.Civ.P. 46, Mr. Boyle preserved his request for voir dire on the subject 
of tort reform. However, even if some ambiguity existed on the issue, the trial court's 
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failure to conduct the requested voir dire would constitute plain error anyway, because 
the error was "plain," and it was prejudicial. Davis v. Grand County, 905 P.2d 888, 892 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated that its precedent on 
this issue is "clear," and that the failure to ask tort reform questions is inherently 
prejudicial. Bee, supra; Alcazar, supra; Barrett, supra; Evans, supra. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY HELD THAT 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REFERENCE TO THE MCDONALD'S 
COFFEE CASE WAS NOT GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL. 
Mr. Christensen does not deny that his counsel intentionally and expressly referred 
to the "McDonald's coffee case" in her closing argument. Nor does he deny that Lie beck 
v. McDonald's has become the poster child of tort reform in this country (a case of 
"national notoriety," as Mr. Christensen concedes). Nor does he dispute that counsel 
incorrectly stated the nature of that case by telling the jury that the Liebeck verdict 
resulted from a per diem compensatory damages argument, when it was actually an 
award of punitive damages that had nothing to do with a per diem argument (and, in fact, 
was later remitted). See M. McCann, et al, "Java Jive: Genealogy of a Juridical Icon," 
56 U. Miami L. Rev. 113, 127-130 (2001). 
Mr. Christensen asks the Court to ignore such misconduct by claiming that it was 
merely "non-prejudicial," "harmless" and "innocuous" "lawyer talk" used "to expose 
Plaintiffs prejudicial per diem damages calculations." (Brief of Appellee, p. 19, 21, 
6 
22;.)! Notably, Mr. Christensen does not claim that his counsel was responding to an 
improper argument, only a "prejudicial" one. (Brief of Appellee, pp. 21-22.) (By design, 
of course, every statement made in a closing argument is supposed to be prejudicial. 
That is far different from improper.) 
Mr. Christensen says that Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co., 11 Utah 
2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960) is "particularly on-point," because the attorney in that case 
made a per diem argument, and the Supreme Court said that such arguments are 
"prejudicial." That is correct. The court also said that such arguments are permissible. 
Presumably, that is why Mr. Christensen never objected to Mr. Boyle's counsel's closing 
argument. 
At best, then, Mr. Christensen's argument is that he was entitled to make an 
improper argument in order to counter a proper argument. Not surprisingly, he cites no 
authority for such a proposition. 
In arguing that the statement was mere "lawyer talk," Mr. Christensen contends 
that the statement did not prejudice Mr. Boyle. (Brief of Appellee, p. 19-20.) But the 
Mr. Christensen does not identify the portion of counsel's closing argument to which he 
is referring, but merely asks this Court to assume it was a per diem argument. Because it 
is immaterial to resolution of the issue, Mr. Boyle will not delve into what does or does 
not constitute a per diem argument. 
Courts have held that an improper argument is not appropriate even in response to an 
improper argument. "[A] court of law is no place to resort to the argument of 'he said it 
first' or che did it too.' Opposing counsel's violations of professional standards should 
never be the basis for engaging in professional misconduct. Merely because another 
lawyer allegedly disregards the ethical rules does not give the opposing lawyer the right 
to also disregard the rules. Further, asserting that engaging in misconduct because 
another lawyer is also engaging in misconduct is in and of itself misconduct." Lioce v. 
Cohen, 174 P.3d 970, 986 (Nev. 2008). 
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entire purpose of mentioning the Liebeck case is to appeal to a jury's prejudices. The 
sole issue to be decided in this case was the amount of damages to which Mr. Boyle was 
entitled, and the defendant's strategy was to depict Mr. Boyle as overreaching. It is not 
coincidental that counsel picked the one case that uninformed jurors would most equate 
with that sin. That is the very reason why defense lawyers cite it. 
Mr. Christensen says that "[cjounsel obviously did not mean to offer the case as 
evidence, or a substitute therefore, but simply as a statement offered to appeal to the 
jury's common sense." (Brief of Appellee, p. 22.) Unfortunately, counsel did not simply 
ask jurors to apply their common sense. She did not simply tell jurors that arguments like 
that of plaintiffs counsel result in excessive verdicts. Instead, she drew a direct 
comparison between plaintiffs argument and another specific case, stating, "That's how 
we get verdicts like the McDonald's case with a cup of coffee." Counsel essentially told 
jurors that if they agreed with plaintiffs damages argument, they would be doing the 
same thing the jury did in the infamous McDonald's case. 
Moreover, even under Mr. Christensen's post hoc rationalization, Liebeck would 
have no legitimate application to this case. As noted above, counsel's statement about 
the Liebeck verdict was materially incorrect. That verdict was for punitive, not 
compensatory, damages, and did not result from a per diem argument, as counsel 
(mis)represented. See Brief of Appellant, p. 22. There was no justification, factually or 
legally, for counsel's assertion. 
In arguing that a citation to the single most notorious damages verdict in the nation 
should not be considered prejudicial, Mr. Christensen cites Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 
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411, 360 P.2d 822 (1961). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court determined that a 
particular statement by defense counsel in closing argument regarding a traffic citation 
was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. However, the trial court in that 
case had sustained the plaintiffs objection to the comment, id. at 824, thus conveying to 
the jury the impropriety of the remark. In this case, the trial court overruled the 
objection, suggesting to the jury that counsel's comparison to the McDonald's case was a 
legitimate consideration. 
Moreover, the prejudice in this case resulting from the Liebeck reference is 
necessarily enhanced by the (lack of) voir dire on the very issue symbolized by that case. 
Mr. Boyle was unable to ascertain, let alone challenge, persons whose preconceived 
notions on tort reform made them especially susceptible to the "coffee case" argument. 
The Court of Appeals determination that the trial court acted appropriately in refusing 
tort reform voir dire and in overruling Mr. Boyle's objection to Mr. Christensen's 
counsel's reference to the Liebeck case should be reversed. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF NORRINE BOYLE'S CLAIM FOR 
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM. 
The final issue on appeal, the dismissal of Norrine Boyle's claim for loss of 
consortium, is reviewed de novo. Accordingly, both parties have cited to the record that 
was before the trial court when the ruling was made. Mr. Christensen, however, has 
failed to afford Mrs. Boyle the inferences to which she is entitled as a party opposing a 
motion for summary judgment. 
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For example, Mr. Christensen asks the Court to assume that this was a "very low 
speed" accident. (Brief of Appellee, p. 7.) Although Mr. Christensen testified that he 
struck Mr. Boyle at about ten miles per hour, (R. 354, p. 17), in a truck v. pedestrian 
collision, that is not a "very low speed." 
Mr. Christensen also implies that Mr. Boyle did not have symptoms on the day of 
the accident. (See Brief of Appellee, p. 7.) However, the evidence was that, when Mr. 
Christensen's vehicle struck Mr. Boyle, the tire of the defendant's truck pinned Mr. 
Boyle's foot to the ground as Boyle rode up on the hood. All of the experts, including those 
hired by Mr. Christensen, agreed that the impact was sufficient to cause a ruptured disc. 
Initially, Mr. Boyle was relieved that the accident had not been more severe and that he was 
able to walk away from it. He went back to his employment, but within a short time the 
pain became so severe that he had to excuse himself and leave. The pains in his back 
became severe on the date of the accident. (R. 328.) 
A fact-by-fact response to Mr. Christensen's fact statement need not be delineated, 
however, to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Norrine Boyle's 
claim. Mr. Christensen does not contest that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find a 
"dispute as to the causation and extent of Mr. Boyle's back injury." (Brief of Appellee, p. 
23.) It was also largely uncontested by Mr. Christensen that Mr. Boyle's injury is 
permanent and life-altering. (E.g., R. 334, 342-345 (citing to testimony of plaintiff s expert 
Dr. Lyle Mason).) 
The existence of a fact issue on the first requirement of a loss of consortium claim (a 
significant permanent injury that changes a person's lifestyle) was thus essentially 
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uncontested. Mr. Christensen's principal argument is on the second requirement, 
"incapability of the person of performing the types of jobs the person performed before the 
injury[.r Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11. 
In a departure from his position before the Court of Appeals, where he argued that 
this language must be interpreted to mean "completely" incapable, Mr. Christensen now 
contends that incapability means Mr. Boyle "must be clearly unable to complete the 
essential parts of his job after the injury." {Contrast Brief of Appellee, p. 25, with Brief of 
Appellee at the Court of Appeals, p. 18.) Apparently, Mr. Christensen agrees with the 
District of Utah's interpretation that the statute actually does not impose a literal 
requirement of incapability. 
Under Mr. Christensen's new interpretation of the statute, however, an injury could 
relegate an individual to permanent part-time employment with the accompanying 
ramifications (loss of benefits, impaired promotional opportunities, etc.), yet technically he 
would not be incapable of performing the essential parts of his job after the injury, and 
therefore no loss of consortium claim could obtain. That is not a reasonable interpretation. 
State v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988) ("It is axiomatic that a statute should be 
given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the legislature did not intend an absurd 
or unreasonable result.") 
Contrary to Mr. Christensen's interpretation, Mr. Boyle believes that the statute 
requires that an injury render a person "materially" incapable, i.e., that a material difference 
in the injured party's ability to perform the types of jobs he performed before would satisfy 
the statute. That would include an inability to work full-time any more, and/or an ability to 
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work only through significant pain, both of which were supported by evidence in the record. 
See, e g., R. 261-262 (Mr. Boyle was no longer able to work 40 hours per week; at times is 
unable to work even 30 hours; also describing continuous pain). 
Moreover, an issue of fact existed as to whether the employment that Mr. Boyle was 
able to get after the accident was substantially similar to the type of job he was previously 
able to work. Although Mr. Christensen argues that Mr. Boyle's prior and current 
employment were basically the same, there was testimony from which a jury could have 
found otherwise. See, e.g., R. 331-332 (former job included training functions, extensive 
driving to private residences for sales presentations, and very high income potential; present 
job is sedentary work at a call center). This was an issue of fact that should have been 
submitted to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellants / Plaintiffs respectfully request the 
Court reverse the Court of Appeals, and remand to the trial court for a new trial on the 
claims of John and Norrine Boyle. 
DATED this 12th day of April, 2010. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
\ 
Roger P. Christensen 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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